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Standard security proofs of quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols often rely on symmetry
arguments. In this paper, we prove the security of a three-state protocol that does not possess
rotational symmetry. The three-state QKD protocol we consider involves three qubit states, where
the first two states, |0z〉 and |1z〉, can contribute to key generation and the third state, |+〉 =
(|0z〉 + |1z〉)/
√
2, is for channel estimation. This protocol has been proposed and implemented
experimentally in some frequency-based QKD systems where the three states can be prepared easily.
Thus, by founding on the security of this three-state protocol, we prove that these QKD schemes are,
in fact, unconditionally secure against any attacks allowed by quantum mechanics. The main task
in our proof is to upper bound the phase error rate of the qubits given the bit error rates observed.
Unconditional security can then be proved not only for the ideal case of a single-photon source and
perfect detectors, but also for the realistic case of a phase-randomized weak coherent light source
and imperfect threshold detectors. Our result on the phase error rate upper bound is independent
of the loss in the channel. Also, we compare the three-state protocol with the BB84 protocol. For
the single-photon source case, our result proves that the BB84 protocol strictly tolerates a higher
quantum bit error rate than the three-state protocol; while for the coherent-source case, the BB84
protocol achieves a higher key generation rate and secure distance than the three-state protocol
when a decoy-state method is used.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.-a
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2] allows two dis-
tant parties to expand a previously shared secret key
by sending quantum states through a quantum chan-
nel. The most well-known QKD protocol is the BB84
protocol [1], which has been proved unconditionally se-
cure against any attacks allowed by quantum mechanics
[3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11]. Standard security proofs of
many QKD protocols, including the BB84 protocol, the
SARG04 protocol [12, 13, 14, 15], the symmetric three-
state protocol [16, 17], and the generalized rotationally
symmetric protocol [18, 19], often rely on rotational sym-
metries. In this paper, we prove the security of a QKD
protocol that does not possess rotational symmetry. The
protocol involves Alice sending one of the three qubit
states {|0z〉 , |1z〉 , (|0z〉 + |1z〉)/
√
2} to Bob, where the
first two states are for key generation, and the third state
is for channel estimation. Note that this protocol is sim-
ilar to the BB84 protocol in that they share the same
three qubit states. In fact, in practical implementations
of the BB84 protocol, when one of the four laser sources is
out of operation (due to, for example, malfunctioning),
the QKD scheme implemented becomes the three-state
protocol that we consider in this paper. The security
proof of the three-state protocol analyzed in this paper
∗Electronic address: cffung@comm.utoronto.ca
†Electronic address: hklo@comm.utoronto.ca
then assures that even the handicapped BB84 protocol
can still be secure in these situations [20]. This three-
state protocol has also been proposed and implemented
in some frequency-based QKD systems [21, 22, 23]1. In
these frequency-based systems, the state |0z〉 (|1z〉) is
represented by a pulse in frequency ω0 (ω1), while the
state (|0z〉 + |1z〉)/
√
2 is represented by a pulse in a su-
perposition of the two frequencies. In these systems, it
is relatively easy to generate the three states and thus
the three-state protocol is well suited for these systems.
In order to understand the security of these systems, a
rigourous security analysis of the three-state protocol is
in order, and it is the purpose of this paper to provide
such an analysis. We note that a similar protocol has
been proposed and implemented in some time-bin-based
QKD systems [24, 25, 26, 27, 28]. In one time-bin-based
scheme [28], each signal is associated with two time po-
sitions and there are three different signals. A logic 0
(1) is represented by a light pulse in the first (second)
position and no pulse in the other position; while a de-
coy signal is represented by a superposition of a pulse in
the first position and a pulse in the second position. The
channel is estimated by checking the coherence between
1 Note that some of these systems actually prepare the state |0z〉+
|1z〉 instead, which has a different normalization (without the
factor of
√
2) than the one we consider. These QKD systems
are not qubit-based and thus our security proof is not directly
applicable to them.
2two consecutive non-empty pulses appearing within or
across the bit separations. This gives rise to the differ-
ence between this protocol and the one we consider in
this paper. If only the coherence within the bit separa-
tions was checked, then it is equivalent to our protocol.
Thus, the analysis in the paper does not directly apply
to this particular time-bin-based scheme. On the other
hand, the result of this paper suggests that even if only
the coherence within the bit separations is checked, un-
conditional security can still be established, thus making
it unnecessary to check for the across-the-bit coherence
for the sake of achieving unconditional security. This
means that a secure time-bin-based scheme can be built
by implementing the three-state protocol analyzed in this
paper, where the channel-estimation state is realized by
checking the within-the-bit coherence.
In this paper, we prove the unconditional security
of the three-state protocol not only for the case of a
single-photon source, but also for the case of a phase-
randomized weak coherent-state source. Essentially, the
reason that the protocol is secure is because the informa-
tion gain by an eavesdropper implies disturbance in the
signals received by a legitimate receiver. Here, our main
task is to make this argument rigourous and quantita-
tive. To do this, we upper bound the phase error rate of
the key-generating qubits using the bit error rates of the
key-generating qubits and the channel-estimation qubits
(c.f. Eq. (26)) with the assumption that a single-photon
source is used. Once the phase error rate is estimated,
we may establish the security of the protocol by apply-
ing Shor-Preskill’s argument [6] when a single-photon
source is used, and by applying the result of Gottesman-
Lo-Lu¨tkenhaus-Preskill (GLLP) [8] and the decoy-state
method [29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38] when a
coherent light source is used. We remark that our result
on the phase error rate upper bound is independent of
the loss in the channel, similar to the BB84 protocol.
The paper is organized as follows: We first describe
the three-state protocol in Section II. In Section III, we
upper bound the phase error rate of the key-generating
qubits. This upper bound can then be used to compute
the key generation rate for both the ideal case and the
realistic case in Section IV. We finally conclude in Sec-
tion V.
II. THE PROTOCOL
In this section, we outline the three-state protocol in
prepare-and-measure version which is how it can be im-
plemented in reality without a quantum computer, and
in entanglement distillation protocol (EDP)-based ver-
sion which is equivalent to the prepare-and-measure form
and is used mainly for proving the security. In the follow-
ing, we assume that Alice and Bob are equipped with a
perfect single-photon source and perfect detectors. Also,
only the qubits detected by Bob are considered, and thus
the security proof of this protocol is loss independent.
We use the following notations: the eigenstates in the
Z basis are |0z〉 and |1z〉, whereas the eigenstates in the
X basis are |+〉 , (|0z〉 + |1z〉)/
√
2 and |−〉 , (|0z〉 −
|1z〉)/
√
2.
A. Prepare-and-measure version
We outline the protocol as follows:
1 Alice chooses a random 8N(1 + δ)-bit string a, where
δ > 0 is a small parameter. For each bit i, if ai = 0,
she transmits a state randomly chosen in the |0z〉,
|1z〉 basis; if ai = 1, she transmits |+〉.
2 Bob receives the 8N(1+ δ) qubits and using a random
8N(1 + δ)-bit string b measures each qubit in the
Z basis (if bi = 0) or the X basis (if bi = 1).
3 Alice announces a and Bob announces b.
4 They discard any results where ai 6= bi. With high
probability, there are at least 4N bits left and 2N
of them belong to each basis. Alice decides N bits
in the Z basis as the check bits and the remaining
N bits in the Z basis as the data bits.
5 Alice and Bob announce the values of the N check bits
in the Z basis and the 2N check bits in the X basis.
They compute the quantum bit error rates for the
two sets separately. We denote the two quantum bit
error rate (QBER) values by eb and α, respectively.
6 They choose an error correcting code capable of cor-
recting errors at a bit error rate of eb. Alice com-
putes the bit error syndrome of her data bits using
this code and transmits the syndrome to Bob. Bob
corrects the errors in his data bits.
7 They estimate the phase error rate ep of the data bits
from eb and α and choose a binary block code capa-
ble of correcting errors at a rate of ep. They apply
the generator matrix of the code to their data bits,
producing the final secret key.
We remark that the data bits consist of only the key-
generating qubits {|0z〉 , |1z〉}, while the check bits consist
of all qubits, {|0z〉 , |1z〉 , |+〉}, of which the first two are
also used for the key generation and the third is only for
channel estimation. The task is to estimate the phase
error rate, ep, of the data bits from the bit error rates, eb
and α, of the check bits. Also note that this three-state
protocol is very similar to the BB84 protocol. The only
difference is that the |−〉 state in BB84 is not used in this
protocol.
B. EDP-based version
Now we describe the equivalent EDP-based QKD pro-
tocol. During the quantum state transmission phase, Al-
ice sends Bob 4N quantum signals through a channel
3controlled by an eavesdropper Eve. Specifically, for the
lth signal, Alice prepares the state
|Ψ〉AB =
1√
2
|0〉K
[ 1√
2
|0z〉A |0z〉B +
1√
2
|1z〉A |1z〉B
]
+
1√
2
|1〉K |+〉A |+〉B (1)
and sends system B to Bob through Eve while keeping
system A to herself. In the most general attack by Eve,
she interacts the 4N signals sent by Alice and some an-
cilla with an unitary operation. An output qubit from the
unitary operation is then sent to Bob for the lth transmis-
sion. We assume that Bob always uses the same basis as
Alice for each qubit pair, since the qubit pairs where Al-
ice and Bob measure with different bases are discarded.
Specifically, for the 2N check qubit pairs in the |1〉K part,
Bob measures in the {|+〉 , |−〉} basis, and since Alice al-
ways sends the |+〉 state to Bob, he declares an error (no
error) if the measurement outcome is |−〉 (|+〉). This al-
lows him to compute the QBER for this part, which we
denote by α. For the 2N qubit pairs in the |0〉K part,
Alice and Bob randomly choose N of them as check qubit
pairs and compare their values publicly. They both per-
form Z basis measurements on them and announce their
measurement outcomes in order to compute the QBER
for these N qubit pairs, which we denote by eb. An error
correcting code capable of correcting errors up to a bit
error rate of eb can be used by Alice and Bob to remove
errors in the remaining N data qubit pairs, which are
then privacy amplified to produce the final key. Since
the amount of privacy amplification needed to eliminate
Eve’s information on the final key is indicated by the
phase error rate of the data qubit pairs (denoted by ep),
Alice and Bob need to upper bound this quantity from
what they observed, eb and α. In what follows, we solve
this problem of upper bounding ep given fixed values of
eb and α. Once ep is obtained, the key generation rate
can easily be computed using ep and eb.
III. UPPER BOUNDING THE PHASE ERROR
RATE
In this section, we solve the main problem of upper
bounding the phase error rate in the data qubit pairs,
using the bit error rates observed in the check qubit pairs.
The values eb and α are actually observed in the check
qubit pairs, not in the data qubit pairs. On the other
hand, we are interested in the bit error rates of the data
qubit pairs, not the check qubit pairs. In order to relate
eb and α to the data qubit pairs, we apply a random
sampling argument to infer that what is observed in the
check qubit pairs is very close to what could be observed
in the data qubit pairs. Specifically, the random sampling
argument can be stated as follows:
Lemma 1 (Random sampling test (see, for exam-
ple, [39])). Given 2N bits, they are randomly divided
into two sets, each containing N bits. Then,
Pr{c1 < δN and c2 > (δ + ǫ)N} < exp[−O(ǫ2N)], (2)
where c1 and c2 are the number of ones in the two sets,
δ ≤ 1 is some fraction representing the number of ones,
and ǫ > 0 is a small parameter.
Therefore, with high probability, the bit error rates
of eb and α could be observed in the data qubit pairs.
Note that the use of classical probability argument is
valid here, since the events contributing to eb, ep, and
α are outcomes of a projection measurement projecting
onto the states {|0〉K |φij〉 ,|1〉K |φi′j′〉: i, j, i′, j′ = 0, 1}.
Here, |φij〉 are the Bell states:
|φij〉 = 1√
2
(|0i〉z + (−1)j |1i¯〉z). (3)
In what follows, because of this random sampling argu-
ment, we assume that the QBERs eb and α are also ob-
served in the N data qubit pairs. Now the model be-
comes Alice sending N data qubits to Bob through Eve
who may perform on them any joint operation that are
consistent with eb and α. Since we only consider the
data qubit pairs, we index them from l = 1 to l = N
for simplicity. Eve’s operation on the lth data qubit pair
can conveniently be represented in the Kraus (or opera-
tor sum) form, E(l)(ρ) =∑f E(l,f)ρE(l,f)†, where the set
of operator {E(l,f) : ∀f} defines the mapping for the lth
data qubit pair, and all the other data qubit pairs have
been traced over. Recall that the our main problem is
to upper bound ep over all Eve’s operations E(l)(·) that
are consistent with the observed values of eb and α. Es-
sentially, there are two constraints in our optimization
problem – one associated with eb and the other with α.
We first consider the constraint with α by computing the
correct/incorrect probabilities associated with each data
qubit pair if a measurement in the |1〉K basis were to be
performed. In this basis, there are only two outcomes –
either that Alice sends |+〉 and Bob receives |+〉 (no bit
error) or that Alice sends |+〉 and Bob receives |−〉 (a bit
error). The corresponding probabilities are
p
(l)
+− , Pr{error at position l} (4)
= KAB〈1 +−|E(l)(|Ψ〉 〈Ψ|)|1 +−〉KAB
p
(l)
++ , Pr{no error at position l} (5)
= KAB 〈1 + +| E(l)(|Ψ〉 〈Ψ|)|1 + +〉KAB.
(The notation used is that +− (++) in the subscript
means that Alice sends |+〉 and Bob measures |−〉 (|+〉).)
To construct the first constraint, we need to relate these
two probabilities for the data bits to α. Note that they
are not related in a straightforward manner, since α is the
observed bit error rate in the data qubit pairs (inferred
from that of the check qubit pairs using the random sam-
pling argument) while we only have probabilities of each
data qubit pair on hand. In this situation, we utilize
4Azuma’s inequality [40] to establish the relation, as used
similarly in [14, 15, 17]. To proceed, we obtain Eve’s
operation on the lth qubit pair, E(l)(·), by tracing over
the previously measured qubit pairs conditional on their
measurement outcomes and unconditionally tracing over
the qubit pairs to be measured later. This means that
the two probabilities in Eqs. (4) and (5) are now con-
ditional probabilities, conditional on the measurement
outcomes of the previously measured qubits. Consid-
ering each event separately, Azuma’s inequality asserts
that the sum of the error (no error) probabilities over all
qubits is close to the observed counts of the error (no
error) events. Mathematically, it means that
Pr
[∣∣∣∣∣c+± −
∑N
l=1 p
(l)
+±
N
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ ǫ
]
≤ 2 exp−Nǫ2/2, (6)
where c+− (c++) is the observed counts of the error (no
error) events, p
(l)
+− (p
(l)
++) is error (no error) probabil-
ity for the lth qubit pairs given by Eq. (4) (Eq. (5)),
and ǫ > 0 is a small quantity. Note that this proba-
bility drops exponentially as N increases. Now, since
α = c+−/(c+− + c++) by definition, it is easy to relate
p
(l)
+± to α as N goes to infinity as follows:
α =
∑N
l=1 p
(l)
+−∑N
l=1 p
(l)
+− + p
(l)
++
. (7)
Note that no actual measurement in the {|+〉 , |−〉} ba-
sis is performed on the data qubit pairs (only measure-
ments in the {|0z〉 , |1z〉} basis are performed on them)
and thus we have no measurement outcomes of the ear-
lier qubit pairs to explicitly form E(l)(·). Nevertheless,
Eq. (7) holds for any measurement outcomes, and there
is no need to know what these outcomes are. Note that
as an alternative to Azuma’s inequality, the quantum de
Finetti theorems [41, 42, 43, 44] may be used to argue
that the entanglement between a subset of the randomly
permuted qubit pairs vanishes, establishing Eq. (7) also.
In this case, a sublinear number of qubit pairs have to be
discarded.
By the same token, the second constraint of our opti-
mization problem associated with eb can be constructed
in a similar way. In this case, there are four possibilities
associated with the data qubit pairs: no error, a bit er-
ror, a phase error, and both types of errors. Thus, they
give rise to the following four probabilities:
q(l)rs , K〈0|AB 〈φrs| E(l)(|Ψ〉 〈Ψ|)|φrs〉AB |0〉K , (8)
r, s = 0, 1,
where |φrs〉 are the Bell states defined in Eq. (3). Apply-
ing Azuma’s inequality gives
eb =
∑N
l=1 q
(l)
10 + q
(l)
11∑N
l=1 q
(l)
00 + q
(l)
10 + q
(l)
11 + q
(l)
01
(9)
ep =
∑N
l=1 q
(l)
01 + q
(l)
11∑N
l=1 q
(l)
00 + q
(l)
10 + q
(l)
11 + q
(l)
01
. (10)
Therefore, our optimization problem becomes maximiz-
ing ep given in Eq. (10) over Eve’s operations E(l)(·) sub-
ject to Eqs. (7) and (9). To simplify the problem, by
using the parameterization E(l,f) = a
(l,f)
I I + a
(l,f)
X X +
a
(l,f)
Y Y + a
(l,f)
Z Z and explicitly evaluating p
(l)
+± and q
(l)
rs ,
we re-write the maximization problem as follows:
maximize
ep =
∑
l,f
∣∣∣a(l,f)Z ∣∣∣2 + ∣∣∣a(l,f)Y ∣∣∣2
∑
l,f
∣∣∣a(l,f)I ∣∣∣2 + ∣∣∣a(l,f)X ∣∣∣2 + ∣∣∣a(l,f)Y ∣∣∣2 + ∣∣∣a(l,f)Z ∣∣∣2
(11)
subject to
eb =
∑
l,f
∣∣∣a(l,f)X ∣∣∣2 + ∣∣∣a(l,f)Y ∣∣∣2
∑
l,f
∣∣∣a(l,f)I ∣∣∣2 + ∣∣∣a(l,f)X ∣∣∣2 + ∣∣∣a(l,f)Y ∣∣∣2 + ∣∣∣a(l,f)Z ∣∣∣2
(12)
α =
∑
l,f
∣∣∣ia(l,f)Y − a(l,f)Z ∣∣∣2
∑
l,f
∣∣∣ia(l,f)Y − a(l,f)Z ∣∣∣2 + ∣∣∣a(l,f)I + a(l,f)X ∣∣∣2
(13)
where the maximization is over all a
(l,f)
β , β = I,X, Y, Z.
Note that the summation over all the qubit pairs l in this
problem signifies that Eve’s attack is a joint attack. How-
ever, the following theorem says that a collective attack
by Eve is as powerful as a joint attack in the sense of caus-
ing the same bit and phase error rates {eb, α, ep}. Fur-
thermore, Eve’s collective attack only needs to consist of
one Kraus operator. This theorem essentially eliminates
the need to consider joint attacks in upper bounding the
phase error rate.
Theorem 1 (Reduction from a joint attack to a
collective attack). For the three-state protocol, any val-
ues of the bit and phase error rates {eb, α, ep} achievable
by any joint attack consisting of any number of Kraus
operators are also achievable by a collective attack con-
sisting of only one Kraus operator.
Proof. The idea is that any two sets
{a(l,f)I , a(l,f)X , a(l,f)Y , a(l,f)Z } and {a(l
′,f ′)
I , a
(l′,f ′)
X , a
(l′,f ′)
Y ,
a
(l′,f ′)
Z } can be combined into one set without changing
the values of eb, α, and ep (see Appendix A). Repeated
applications of this idea can reduce any number of
sets into one set. This means that whatever values of
{eb, α, ep} achievable by any number of sets are also
achievable by just one set.
The consequence of this theorem is that it is sufficient
to consider (l, f) taking on only one value (i.e. drop-
ping the summations over l and f) in the maximization
problem in Eq. (11) without loss of generality. This is
5an important consequence since the original maximiza-
tion problem in Eq. (11) involves infinitely many opti-
mization variables (a
(l,f)
β , ∀l, f), and the new maximiza-
tion problem involves only four optimization variables
(aI , aX , aY , aZ). This is a significant simplification in
the problem. Note that the reduction from joint attacks
to collective attacks was first discussed in Ref. [45]. The
idea was also implicitly used in Ref. [10]. Similar re-
duction results with explicit proofs were also obtained
in an information-theoretic security proof [46] and can
also be deduced from the quantum de Finetti theorems
[41, 42, 43, 44]. These two techniques are different from
ours. In particular, the difference between the techniques
involving the quantum de Finetti theorems and ours is
that the former requires discarding a sublinear number of
qubits and ours does not require any discarding. This dif-
ference may have practical implications when the number
of qubits is finite. Even though the number of discarded
qubits in the de Finetti approximation is insignificant in
the asymptotic case, it may be significant in the finite sit-
uation. The difference between the information-theoretic
security proof and ours is that in the former, a collective
attack is equal to a joint attack in the sense that the
smooth Re´nyi entropies of the states in the two attacks
are roughly equal, and in our proof, the two attacks are
equal in the sense that they both cause exactly the same
bit and phase error rates. Also, we further show that it
is sufficient to consider a collective attack consisting of
only one Kraus operator as opposed to infinitely many
Kraus operators.
A. Exact upper bound
In order to simplify the maximization problem in
Eq. (11), we first write it as
max
(
|aZ |2 + |aY |2
)
eb (14)
s.t. |aX |2 + |aY |2 = 1 (15)
1− eb
eb
= |aI |2 + |aZ |2 (16)
1− α
α
=
|aI + aX |2
|iaY − aZ |2
(17)
where the first constraint is introduced to fix the scaling
of aβ’s, the second and third constraints are rearrange-
ments of Eq. (12) and Eq. (13). To simplify the problem
further, we note that in order to maximize the objective,
the third constraint should be taken so that aI and aX
are in phase with each other and iaY and aZ are in phase
with each other. This results in the following problem:
max
(
|aZ |2 + |aY |2
)
eb (18)
s.t. |aX |2 + |aY |2 = 1 (19)
eˆb :=
1− eb
eb
= |aI |2 + |aZ |2 (20)
αˆ :=
1− α
α
=
|aI |2 + |aX |2 + 2 |aI | |aX |
|aY |2 + |aZ |2 − 2 |aY | |aZ |
(21)
Since the feasible region in (|aI |, |aX |, |aY |, |aZ |) is de-
scribed by three constraints, we can eliminate two of
them, namely aI and aX , to get one single constraint
describing the feasible region in terms of (|aY |, |aZ |) by
substituting Eqs. (19) and (20) into Eq. (21):
(eˆb − |aZ |2) + (1− |aY |2) + 2
√
1− |aY |2
√
eˆb − |aZ |2 =
αˆ(|aY |2 + |aZ |2 − 2|aY ||aZ |). (22)
Squaring both sides gives a quartic equation, which ad-
mits four solutions for |aZ | in terms of |aY |. However,
there are only two valid solutions in the region eb ≤ 1/2
and α ≤ 1/2:
|aZ | = 1
1 + αˆ
[
αˆ|aY | ±
√
αˆ(1− |aY |2)± (23)√
−1 + eˆb(1 + αˆ)− |aY |2(αˆ− 1)± 2|aY |
√
αˆ(1− |aY |2)
]
,
eb, α ≤ 1/2,
where the signs are (− − +) and (+ + −). Since |aZ | is
part of the objective function of the problem in Eq. (18),
we want to use of the solution of |aZ | that is the largest.
Therefore, we use the solution of |aZ | with signs (++−)
and the problem becomes
max
|aY |≤1
(
|aZ |2 + |aY |2
)
eb (24)
where |aZ | substituted from Eq. (23) with signs (+ +
−). This problem can be solved numerically for some
fixed eb and α to obtain an upper bound on ep (which
is the objective value of the problem). Note that Eve
can always construct an attack with ep = 1/2 that is as
powerful as any arbitrary attack with an arbitrary ep ≤ 1
[47]. She can construct this new attack by launching half
of the time the arbitrary attack and the other half of the
time the arbitrary attack with a phase flip operation. In
this way, the phase error rate of this new attack is 1/2.
B. Limiting cases
We need to deal with the cases that eb = 0, α = 0, or
both separately. For the case that eb = 0 and α > 0, we
see from Eq. (12) that aX = aY = 0 and thus ep = α.
For the case that eb > 0 and α = 0, we see from Eq. (13)
that aZ = iaY and thus ep ≤ 2eb. For the case that
6eb = 0 and α = 0, we have aX = aY = aZ = 0 and thus
ep = 0. Note that the last case is consistent with the idea
that information gain implies disturbance. Since there is
no disturbance in that case, no information is gained by
Eve and thus ep = 0.
C. Closed-form approximate upper bound
It may be difficult to solve the problem in Eq. (24)
analytically. Thus, in order to obtain an analytical upper
bound on ep, instead of using the exact value for |aZ | from
Eq. (23), we use an upper bound of |aZ | which is given
by
|aZ | ≤ 1
1 + αˆ
[
αˆ|aY |+
√
αˆ(1− |aY |2) +
√
−1 + eˆb(1 + αˆ)
]
. (25)
We use this upper bound for |aZ | in the problem
max|aY |≤1
(
|aZ |2 + 1
)
eb. Since the objective value of
this problem is larger than or equal to the objective value
of the original problem in Eq. (24), the solution of this
problem is definitely an upper bound (but may not be
tight) on ep. The solution to the approximate upper
bound is
ep ≤

1 +
(√
αˆ
1 + αˆ
+
1
1 + αˆ
√
−1 + eˆb(1 + αˆ)
)2 eb
=
[
1 +
(√
1− α+ α
√
−1 + 1− eb
ebα
)
)2]
eb
= α+ eb(2− 2α− α2) + (26)
2
√
α(1 − α)eb(1 − eb − ebα), eb, α ≤ 1/2.
Note that the three special cases in Section III B can be
obtained by taking the corresponding limit in Eq. (26).
In order to illustrate how good the approximate upper
bound in Eq. (26) is compared to the optimal one ob-
tained by solving the problem in Eq. (24) numerically,
we plot in Fig. 1 the two bounds on ep over different
values of eb assuming eb = α. It can be seen that the
approximate bound is very close to the optimal one, es-
pecially for small eb. Note that one may obtain another
simple bound on ep from Eq. (26) as
ep ≤ α+ 2eb + 2√ebα. (27)
This bound is close to the bound in Eq. (26) when both
eb and α are small.
D. Special case: eb = α
For the special case eb = α, a linear relation between
eb and the approximate ep can be derived easily. Substi-
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FIG. 1: Comparison of the approximate upper bounds on ep
in Eq. (26) and Eq. (28) with the optimal one obtained by
solving the problem in Eq. (24), assuming eb = α. The solid,
dashed, and dotted curves (from bottom to top) correspond to
the optimal bound (Eq. (24)), the general approximate bound
(Eq. (26)), and the specific approximate bound (Eq. (28)).
tuting α = eb in Eq. (27), we get
ep ≤ 5eb. (28)
This linear relation, which can readily be observed in
Fig. 1, is in sharp contrast to the ep = eb relation for
the BB84 protocol; specifically, there is a factor of 5 in-
crease (approximately) in the relation for this three-state
protocol.
IV. KEY GENERATION RATE
In the previous section, we derived two upper bounds
on the phase error rate for the three-state protocol; an
optimal one is given by the solution of the problem in
Eq. (24), and an approximate one is given by Eq. (26).
Using the phase error rate upper bounds, the key gen-
eration rate can be readily obtained both for the single-
photon source case and for the coherent-source case. Ob-
viously, when comparing the performance of the three-
state protocol and the BB84 protocol, the three-state
protocol can only perform as good as, but no better than,
the BB84 protocol, since one state is absent in the three-
state protocol. Indeed, as we show in the following, the
BB84 protocol is superior to the three-state protocol in
the tolerable QBER, the key generation rate, and the
maximal secure distance.
A. Single-photon source and perfect detectors
When a single-photon source and perfect detectors are
used, the key generation rate on the sifted key using lo-
cal operations and one-way classical communications (1-
LOCC) can be obtained by applying Shor-Preskill’s ar-
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FIG. 2: QBER bounds of the three-state protocol and the ef-
ficient BB84 protocol. For the three-state protocol, the region
below the solid curve is secure with 1-LOCC and the region
above the dashed curve is insecure with 2-LOCC. The solid
curve is computed using the approximate phase error rate up-
per bound in Eq. (26), while the dashed curve is computed
using a method based on intercept-and-resend attacks [48].
For the three-state protocol, the QBER lower bound for the
Z-basis states (the x-intercept) is 0.075 and the QBER lower
bound for the |+〉 state (the y-intercept) is 1/2. The 2-LOCC
lower bound for the efficient BB84 protocol (dotted curve) is
reproduced from Ref. [49] with a higher precision.
gument [6]:
R = 1−H2(eb)−H2(ep), (29)
where ep is either the approximate upper bound in
Eq. (26) or the solution of the problem in Eq. (24), and
H2(x) = −x log2(x)− (1−x) log2(1−x) is the binary en-
tropy function. Fig. 2 shows the secure region using this
key generation rate with the approximate upper bound
in Eq. (26). The curve is found by searching for (eb, α)
such that the key rate in Eq. (29) is zero. The high-
est tolerable QBER of the data bits is eb = 0.075 when
α = 0; whereas the highest tolerable QBER of the check
bits is α = 1/2 when eb = 0. Also shown in the figure
are the upper bound for the protocol with local opera-
tions and two-way classical communications (2-LOCC)
computed using a method based on intercept-and-resend
attacks proposed by us [48], and the lower bound for
the efficient BB84 protocol [50] with 2-LOCC. The lat-
ter is reproduced from Ref. [49] (the “Gottesman-Lo”
curve in Fig. 2 of Ref. [49]) with a higher precision. We
can compare the three-state protocol with the efficient
BB84 protocol regarding the tolerable bit error rates. It
can be seen that the lower bound curve for the efficient
BB84 protocol is above the upper bound curve for the
three-state protocol. Thus, the efficient BB84 protocol
can tolerate higher bit error rates than the three-state
protocol.
We consider the special case eb = α, which corre-
sponds to a 45-degree line in Fig. 2. In this case, we
may obtain the tolerable eb of the three-state protocol
from the figure or by substituting the approximate rela-
tion given in Eq. (28) into the key generation rate for-
mula given in Eq. (29). Using the latter method, we ob-
tain a lower bound of eb = 0.0425, which is substantially
lower than the one-way lower bound of BB84 (eb = 0.110
[6]). The two-way lower bound of BB84 corresponds
to the point where eb = α on the efficient BB84 curve
in Fig. 2, and is equal to 19.9%. This is higher than
the two-way upper bound of the three-state protocol at
eb = α = 14.6%. Thus, the BB84 protocol strictly toler-
ates a higher QBER than the three-state protocol does.
B. Coherent source and imperfect threshold
detectors
In the previous section, we derived the upper bounds
on the phase error rate of the three-state protocol with
the assumption of a single-photon source. Nevertheless,
we can easily establish security when a phase-randomized
weak coherent light source and imperfect threshold de-
tectors are used by applying the decoy-state method
[29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38]. In essence, the
bit error rates of the single-photon emissions, eb and α,
can be upper bounded by the decoy-state method. The
phase error rate of the single-photon emissions, ep, can
then be upper bounded either by using the approximate
bound in Eq. (26) or by solving the problem in Eq. (24).
We can further utilize the result of Ref. [8], which proves
the security of BB84 with an imperfect source, to find
the key generation rate of the three-state protocol on the
sifted key to be
R ≤ −Qµf(Eµ)H2(Eµ) +Q1[1−H2(ep)], (30)
where the subscript µ denotes the mean photon num-
ber for the signal states, Qµ is the gain
2 of the signal
states, Eµ is the QBER of the signal states, Q1 and ep
are the gains and the phase error rates of the single-
photon states, f(x) is the error correction efficiency as a
function of error rate, and H2(x) is the binary entropy
function.
Fig. 3 compares the performance of the three-state pro-
tocol and the BB84 protocol by using the decoy-state
method of Ref. [30]. The simulation parameters used are
from the Gobby-Yuan-Shields (GYS) experiment [51] and
we have used f(Eµ) = 1.22. Here, the phase error rate
of the single-photon emissions, ep, is upper bounded by
solving the problem in Eq. (24). As shown in Fig. 3, the
BB84 protocol is better than the three-state protocol in
both the key generation rate and the maximal secure dis-
tance. Also, the slopes of both curves can be observed
to be approximately the same at short and medium dis-
tances. The difference in the key generation rates for
2 The gain of a particular state (e.g. the signal state or the single-
photon state) is the probability that Alice transmits that state
and Bob’s result is conclusive.
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FIG. 3: Comparison between the three-state protocol and the
BB84 protocol using the decoy-state method of Ref. [30]. The
two key-generation-rate curves are computed from Eq. (30).
The simulation parameters used are from the Gobby-Yuan-
Shields (GYS) experiment [51] and we have used f(Eµ) =
1.22. The optimal mean photon numbers, µ, for both curves
are used at all distances. The maximal secure distance is
88.5km for the three-state protocol and 142.2km for BB84.
the BB84 protocol and the three-state protocol can be
determined from Eq. (30). Note that for the BB84 pro-
tocol, ep = eb, while for the three-state protocol, ep ≈ 5eb
(since we have ep = α in this model of the QKD setup).
Thus, when the mean photon numbers, µ, for both pro-
tocols are the same, the difference in the key generation
rates is simply Q1(H2(5eb)−H2(eb)). On the other hand,
when the mean photon numbers are different as in Fig. 3
where the optimal µ is always used, the difference in the
key generation rates has to be calculated directly using
Eq. (30).
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we considered a three-state protocol and
proved its security. Specifically, we showed how the phase
error rate of the data bits is upper bounded using the bit
error rates observed in the check bits. This protocol is
very similar to the BB84 protocol, sharing the same three
qubit states. Essentially, we showed that, by removing
one state from the BB84 protocol and thus destroying
the rotational symmetry, the protocol is still secure. This
three-state protocol is interesting in itself since it can be
easily implemented in some frequency-based QKD sys-
tems [21, 22, 23]. The result of this work is that these
QKD schemes are in fact secure against the most general
attacks allowed in quantum mechanics.
We compared the three-state protocol with the BB84
protocol both for the single-photon source case and the
coherent source case. Specifically, for the single-photon
source case, we showed that the BB84 protocol can
strictly tolerate higher bit error rates than the three-state
protocol. For the coherent-source case, the achievable
key generation rate and maximal secure distance of the
BB84 protocol are both larger than that of the three-
state protocol, when the decoy-state method of Ref. [30]
is used. In essence, the three-state protocol is inferior
to the BB84 protocol; however, the three-state protocol
does have its own merit of being easily implementable in
some systems.
We may consider some variations of the three-state
protocol. In the three-state protocol we analyzed, Alice
sends states in the Z and X bases with equal probabili-
ties. This gives rise to Bob using the same basis as Alice
with a probability of 1/2, and thus half of the qubit pairs
are discarded. Although not done in this paper, one may
improve on this inefficiency in basis mismatch by apply-
ing the idea of efficient BB84 [50]. In the asymptotic
limit, Alice and Bob use the same basis with probability
approaching one.
In the analysis we provided, we upper bound the phase
error rate of the Z basis states by using the average bit
error rate of the two Z basis states and the bit error rate
of the |+〉 state. On the other hand, it is possible to
perform a more refined analysis by considering the three
bit error rates separately, one for each of the states |0z〉,
|1z〉, and |+〉. Although not addressed in this paper,
such an analysis can be done in a similar manner as in
this paper. In addition, one may consider a three-state
protocol where the check state is not the |+〉 state but
some other state that is an unequal superposition of the
|0z〉 and |1z〉 states, or a four-state protocol involving
the same three states as our three-state protocol plus
a state not on the X-Z plane of the Bloch sphere (e.g.
(|0z〉+i |1z〉)/
√
2). In this case, it would be interesting to
apply the same approach to analyze the security of these
protocols.
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Notes added
After the first posting of our paper on the arXiv e-print
server, we have learnt from Norbert Lu¨tkenhaus about
the existence of an independent proof of the security of
the three-state protocol based on a different approach by
9the Geneva group. Recently, such an independent proof
has appeared in Appendix A of Ref. [52].
APPENDIX A: SUFFICIENCY OF USING ONE
SET OF {aI , aX , aY , aZ}
In this section, we show that it is sufficient to
consider using only one set of {aI , aX , aY , aZ} in
the problem in Eq. (11). The idea is to construct
a new set {aI , aX , aY , aZ} from two existing sets
{a(s)I , a(s)X , a(s)Y , a(s)Z }, where s = 1, 2, such that∣∣aβ∣∣2 = ∣∣a(1)β ∣∣2 + ∣∣a(2)β ∣∣2, β = I,X, Y, Z(A1)∣∣iaY − aZ ∣∣2 = ∣∣ia(1)Y − a(1)Z ∣∣2 + ∣∣ia(2)Y − a(2)Z ∣∣2, (A2)∣∣aI + aX ∣∣2 = ∣∣a(1)I + a(1)X ∣∣2 + ∣∣a(2)I + a(2)X ∣∣2 (A3)
are satisfied, meaning that the values of {eb, α, ep} (c.f.
Eqs. (11)-(13)) are preserved when the new set is used
instead of the two existing ones. Note that condition (A1)
already gives the magnitudes of the new aβ’s. Thus, only
the phases of them remain to be found. Let us consider
the terms with aI and aX (the case for aY and aZ are
exactly the same). First note that we can express |aI +
aX |2 = |aI |2 + |aX |2 + 2c|aI ||aX |, where |c| ≤ 1 is a
function of the phase difference between aI and aX and
is what we need to determine next. Once we have found
c, we can construct the new set by letting aX = |aX | and
aI = exp(i arccos c)|aI |.
To find c, we write condition (A3) as
c
∣∣aI ∣∣∣∣aX ∣∣ = c(1)∣∣a(1)I ∣∣∣∣a(1)X ∣∣+ c(2)∣∣a(2)I ∣∣∣∣a(2)X ∣∣, (A4)
where condition (A1) has been used to eliminate the
square terms. From this, we can readily get
c =
c(1)
∣∣a(1)I ∣∣∣∣a(1)X ∣∣+ c(2)∣∣a(2)I ∣∣∣∣a(2)X ∣∣√∣∣a(1)I ∣∣2 + ∣∣a(2)I ∣∣2
√∣∣a(1)X ∣∣2 + ∣∣a(2)X ∣∣2
, (A5)
where we have again used condition (A1). All that is left
to do is to verify that |c| ≤ 1 as follows:
|c| ≤
∣∣a(1)I ∣∣∣∣a(1)X ∣∣+ ∣∣a(2)I ∣∣∣∣a(2)X ∣∣√∣∣a(1)I ∣∣2 + ∣∣a(2)I ∣∣2
√∣∣a(1)X ∣∣2 + ∣∣a(2)X ∣∣2
(A6)
=
1 + gIgX√
1 + g2I
√
1 + g2X
, (A7)
where the first inequality follows from the fact that
|c(1)| ≤ 1 and |c(2)| ≤ 1, and we have used the defini-
tions gI ,
∣∣a(2)I ∣∣/∣∣a(1)I ∣∣ and gX , ∣∣a(2)X ∣∣/∣∣a(1)X ∣∣. Now, it is
easy to show that the right hand side of Eq. (A7) is less
than or equal to 1. For the special case that
∣∣a(1)I ∣∣ = 0
and/or
∣∣a(1)X ∣∣ = 0, the same conclusion of |c| ≤ 1 can be
trivially seen.
The construction of the new aY and aZ is similar to
the above (which is for aI and aX), by using conditions
(A1) and (A2).
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